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Privacy and Public Health in the Information Age:
Electronic Health Records and the Minnesota
Health Records Act
Kari Bomash*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004 President George W. Bush announced a new
federal initiative to develop electronic health records (“EHR”)
for every American by 2014 because of their tremendous
promise to reduce medical errors, reduce administrative costs
in the health care system, and improve public health research.1
In response to President Bush’s announcement, Minnesota
Governor Tim Pawlenty, in 2005, supported a statewide
mandate that every health care provider in Minnesota would
have EHRs by 2015.2 One of the first pieces of legislation
Minnesota passed to meet the 2015 mandate was the
Minnesota Health Records Act (“MHRA”), which was hailed as
creating an “electronic superhighway for medical records.”3
© 2009 Kari Bomash.
* Kari Bomash, J.D., M.P.H., is an Associate in the Health Law Group at
Dorsey & Whitney. I would like to thank Susan Foote for her understanding,
patience, and guidance, and Donna McAlpine for helping me to finish this
project despite enormous challenges.
1. See, e.g., Laura Dunlop, Electronic Health Records: Interoperability
Challenges Patients’ Right to Privacy, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 16, 16
(2007).
2. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.495 (West. Supp. 2008); MINN. DEPT. OF
HEALTH, FINAL REPORT ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY BARRIERS TO, AND
SOLUTIONS FOR, THE ELECTRONIC EXCHANGE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
(2007),
available
at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/ehealth/mpsp/solutionsrpt.pdf [hereinafter Solutions Report]; Summary of 2007
HHS Omnibus Bill, http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/opa/07legsumm.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
3. Lorna Benson, Network Will Link Patient Records, MINN. PUB. RADIO,
Sept.
10,
2007,
available
at
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/09/10/healthrecords;
see
also MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH, FROM VISION TO ACTION: THE MINNESOTA E-

117

BOMASH.WEB

118

2/20/2009 10:59:31 AM

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

The MHRA re-codified existing state law regarding the
disclosure of medical records and added three new features
which were developed in an attempt to remove patient consentrelated barriers from the development and implementation of
Those features are: (1) Record Locator Services
EHRs.4
(“RLS”)—electronic indexes stating the physical location of a
patient’s records; (2) “representation of consent,” which allows
a disclosing provider to accept a requesting provider’s
statement that there is valid consent for record disclosure in
lieu of a signed consent form from the patient; and (3) liability
for illegal disclosure for a “bad actor.”5 Privacy advocates,
echoing the concerns of some media and scholars, argued before
the Minnesota State Legislature that the MHRA weakens
patient privacy protections for medical records by encouraging
EHR development.6
This article analyzes whether the MHRA adequately
protects patient privacy while moving Minnesota toward its
2015 goal. First, the article explores the importance of patient
privacy protection as a public health policy in the context of
EHRs. Second, it briefly outlines the legal landscape of EHR
privacy regulation. Third, the article considers whether the
previous Minnesota medical records disclosure law was a
barrier to EHR implementation. Fourth, it examines whether
public health needs were adequately considered in the MHRA
and whether the law balances individual privacy with EHR
development. Finally, the article considers whether and how
the MHRA should be amended to better meet public health
privacy goals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND PATIENT CONSENT OF
HEALTH INITIATIVE (2008), available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/ehealth/legrpt2008.pdf [hereinafter E-Health Initiative].
4. Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: Hearing on H.F. 1726 Before H.
Comm. on Public Safety and Civil Justice, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2007)
(statement
of
Jim
Golden),
available
at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/archivescomm.asp?comm=6000&ls_ye
ar=85) [hereinafter Mar. 21, 2007 hearing].
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: Hearing on S.F. 1701
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2007), available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/schedule/schedule.php?date=5/1/2007&type
=weekly&ls=85 [hereinafter May 1, 2007 hearing].
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RECORD DISCLOSURE
Electronic medical records (EMRs) generally refer to any
medical record or part of a medical record that is kept in an
electronic format.7 Thus, an EMR could include any or all of
the following: lab results, x-rays, prescriptions, physicians’
notes, or research on a specific patient.8 An EHR is an
interoperable EMR.
Currently, most EMRs are not
interoperable, even if networks have purchased EMR
Interoperable EMR
technology from the same vendor.9
technology has not thus far developed because: (1) there are no
agreed-upon data standards for interoperability; (2) there is not
a consistent incentive scheme to encourage interoperable
development; and (3) there are increasing technological
differences between EMR databases as vendors build more
specialized systems for different health care networks.10
At present, patient privacy protection of medical records is
controlled mostly by patient consent laws that define how and
when a patient must consent before a physician may disclose
the patient’s medical records to anyone else.11 Consent is a
concept that works relatively well to protect paper records
because of the physical size of medical records, and the fact
that most are stored piecemeal at multiple medical facilities.12
The difficulty of mining paper records for information limits the
7. Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and
Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 700–07
(2007)(“There are great advantages to using electronic medical records more
extensively, both within the offices of individual providers, where they are
known as electronic medical records (EMRs), and also when such records are
linked across multiple providers, in which case they are known as electronic
health records (EHRs).”); see generally Elisabeth Belmont & Adele A. Waller,
The Role of Information Technology in Reducing Medical Errors, 36 J. HEALTH
L. 615, 616 (2003); Brent James, E-Health: Steps On The Road to
Interoperability,
HEALTH
AFFS.
,
Jan.
19,
2005,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.26/DC1.
8. See generally Belmont & Waller, supra note 7.
9. Id. at 617–618.
10. Peter Pharow & Bernd Blobel, Specific Interoperability Problems of
Security Infrastructure Services, in 3 MED. & CARE COMPUNETICS 349, 360–61
(L. Bos et. al eds. 2006); Robert Malone, Note, Health Information Technology:
Transforming the Healthcare Industry for the 21st Century, 3 OKLA. J. L. &
TECH. 36, 3 (2007).
11. Alicia Ouellette & Jacob Reider, Practical, State, and Federal Limits
on the Scope of Compelled Disclosure of Health Records, 7 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS
46, 46–47 (2007).
12. Id.
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utility and consequences of theft.13 In an interoperable system
where these organizational issues no longer exist, patient
consent may be only one piece of a broader scheme of privacy
regulation designed to more adequately protect the patient
from foreseen and unforeseen uses of patient data.14
B. PATIENT PRIVACY PROTECTION AS A PUBLIC HEALTH AIM
The creation of an EHR network that allows researchers to
access de-identified population-level data would aid public
health in all three of its core functions: assessment, assurance,
and policy promotion. Privacy protection is integral to ensuring
that high-quality data are collected by such a network.
Therefore, patient privacy is a legitimate public health aim.
Moreover, security breaches of EHRs could have broad social
consequences which justify government regulation to protect
patient privacy.
An interoperable system that allows public health
researchers to access de-identified population level data would
allow for better and faster assessment of diseases that strike
the general population and sub-populations.15 It would also
allow for non-industry assessment of competing treatments and
faster development of evidence-based physician treatment
guidelines.16
An EHR network can help assure good population health
by allowing the Centers for Disease Control or local health
departments to track disease outbreaks in near real time.17
This development may reduce the time it takes to stop the
spread of the disease, and thus improve assurance that the
disease can be contained.18 An EHR network also has public
health benefits for emergency and disaster planning.19 It
would allow relocated patients to access complete medical
records, regardless of the physical state of their physician’s
13. Cf. Terry & Francis, supra note 7, at 700–07.
14. Id.
15. Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of
Health Care Privacy, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 680, 685–87 (2004).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 686.
18. See id.
19. Robert Malone, Note, Health Information Technology, E-Prescribing
and Hurricane Katrina: Could Electronic Health Records Have Made A
Difference?, 3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 38, 9 (2007).
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office, and thus minimize any interruption of care that might
result from a disaster.20 Therefore, EHRs would lessen the
negative health impacts due to relocation. Finally, an EHR
system can help improve the daily care that a patient receives
because it can be designed to prospectively check prescription
drug interactions and to facilitate the execution of treatment
guidelines so that patients will receive the most appropriate,
evidence-based care.21
An EHR network would aid in policy promotion because it
could provide more accurate data regarding the incidence and
prevalence of disease, the effectiveness of alternative
treatments for those diseases, and the treatment costs.22 Such
information will help health agencies prioritize health agendas,
advocate for funding and research, and plan cost-effective
interventions that improve the public’s health.
Promoting and protecting the privacy of patient medical
records is vital to maintaining a functioning public health
system.23 Two renowned scholars in public health and law,
Lawrence Gostin and James G. Hodge, have developed the
theory that there is a synergistic relationship between privacy
protection and public health benefits deriving from shared
information.24 They argue that successful information
technology for public health depends upon strong privacy
protection
because
public
health
entities
(usually
governmental) cannot function without the support and trust of
individuals.25 To maintain that trust, individuals must believe
that public health agencies will not misuse or abuse health
20. Id. at 6–7.
21. See June M. Sullivan, Recent Developments and Future Trends in
Electronic Medical and Personal Health Records, 19 HEALTH L. 16, 16 (2007);
Terry & Francis, supra note 7, at 692–93.
22. MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH, PROTECTING COMMUNITIES THROUGH
IMPROVED PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2007), available at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/mnphin/legrpt2007.pdf
[hereinafter
Information Systems Report].
23. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and
Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health
Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2002); James G.
Hodge, Jr., Health Information Privacy and Public Health, 31 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 663, 663 (2003) [hereinafter Hodge I]; James G. Hodge, Jr., National
Health Information Privacy and New Federalism, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 791, 791 (2000) [hereinafter Hodge II].
24. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 23, at 1441–43.
25. Id. at 1442.
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information and will strongly protect patient data.26 Otherwise
patients may not wish to participate fully or they might
withhold sensitive information which may affect the individual
patient’s treatment and, at a population level, skew research
results and policy proposals that result from that research.27
In other words, in order to get accurate data that can lead to
valid research and policy development, public health agencies
must be able to protect the individual privacy of those records.
The privacy of EHRs also has public health ramifications
due to the potential scale of security breaches. Currently,
paper records are not very secure.28 Someone intent on
stealing records could easily walk into most clinics and walk
out with files.29 However, such a theft is limited to affecting
the individuals whose records are stolen because of the physical
size of the files and the fact that they are housed in disparate
locations. Further, there is not a great market for this medical
information because of the difficulty in amassing a large
volume of records. Electronic records may actually be more
secure than paper records, if for no other reason than that
clinics would have password-protected systems to access
them.30 It would take a higher level of skill to hack into even a
moderately secure system than to walk into an office and steal
paper records. The difference is that should someone steal
electronic records, they could potentially steal a huge number
of them and they could steal an entire record rather than just a
piece.31 The scope of the theft creates the possibility of
producing markets for medical information to employers or
insurance companies who want to reduce costs, or to medical
companies that will mine that data for marketing health
products, or to health care entities themselves who want to win
patients.32 These consequences have much broader social
implications than the theft of individual files because the data
could then be used for private financial gain rather than for
legitimate public health purposes.
A full-fledged public health privacy policy should be
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 1551–52.
See May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6; Sullivan, supra note 21, at 17.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 17.
Id.
Magnusson, supra note 15, at 685.
Id.
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developed because privacy protection is integral to continuing
and developing EHR networks. The absence of a well-designed
policy means that there are no consequences for data misuse
because such misuse is not prohibited. The absence of a
privacy policy will not prevent EHR development. It will
simply mean that whether and what kind of privacy protections
are used with EHR technology will be determined by industry
instead of by government and public health agencies.
A review of the literature ultimately shows three key areas
on which a public health privacy policy should focus: patient
consent, data security standards, and data use. The first issue
is that of patient consent to record disclosure and how that
process will and will not work with EHRs.33 The second issue
This
is the assumption that data will not be secure.34
assumption suggests that any privacy policy for EHRs must
include data security requirements to protect data beyond a
patient’s consent. The third issue considers how medical
information will be used.35 This concern suggests that public
policy must define acceptable and unacceptable data uses; it
must also determine consequences for data abuse in an attempt
to minimize the creation of markets for inappropriate data use.
The issues of consent, data standards, and information use
should be developed simultaneously in relation to each other as
the protections of each may change depending on the
protections of the others. For example, the consent process
may change depending on the data security requirements.
Likewise, the data security requirements might change based
on the intended data use.
In order to protect the privacy of records and to meet public
health aims, government can either: (1) build a public
infrastructure for the exchange of records and extrapolation of

33. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Compelled
Disclosure of Health Information: Protecting Against the Greatest Potential
Threat to Privacy, 295 JAMA 2882 (2006); Terry & Francis, supra note 7;
Kristin E. Schleiter, The Dinosaur in the Office: A Consideration of the
Technical and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Adoption of Digital Medical
Data and the Extinction of the Paper Record, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L. 353, 356–
57 (2007).
34. See, e.g., Latour Lafferty, Medical Identity Theft: The Future Threat of
Health Care Fraud Is Now, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 11, 11 (2007);
Magnusson, supra note 15; Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 33.
35. See, e.g., Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 33; Terry & Francis, supra
note 7.
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data that will protect individual privacy or (2) develop a
regulatory framework of privacy and security requirements by
which private industry may act. These solutions differ from
policy that promotes EHRs for individual medical benefit
because those policies focus more on organizational-level
privacy regulation (mostly via patient consent) and technology
adoption. A public health privacy policy includes patient
consent, but also regulates the technology industry directly to
provide technological security. The MHRA is an indication that
Minnesota has decided to develop regulation for private entities
rather than to build the EHR infrastructure itself.
C. LAYERS OF INTERLOCKING REGULATION
Currently there is no cohesive medical data privacy policy
in the United States.36 Instead, laws are divided between state
and federal governments and organized by different categories
of regulation (such as consent and data standards).37 Most of
the discussion of privacy protection laws and health records
focuses on whether the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) provides sufficient protection of
patients’ medical records, or alternatively, how HIPAA has
been or could be changed to encourage EHR networks.38 As a
federal law, HIPAA can provide uniform rules across states for
EHR privacy. However, HIPAA is considered a regulatory
“floor,” meaning that all states must at a minimum provide
HIPAA protections of medical records, although states are free
to provide more stringent protections.39 Therefore, state
regulation such as Minnesota’s may have a greater impact
upon the development of EHR technology and privacy within
the state. In fact, many state laws require greater levels of
protection for medical records than does HIPAA.40 As a result,
the nationwide privacy protection of medical records is a
patchwork of different laws and standards which in and of
36. See Terry & Francis, supra note 7, at 683.
37. See Nancy J. Brent, The Use and Misuse of Electronic Patient Data, 28
J. OF INFUSION NURSING 251, 252–54 (2005).
38. See, e.g., id.; Bridget M. Carney, Breaches of Confidentiality and the
Electronic Community Health Record: Challenges for Healthcare
Organizations and the Community, 13 H.E.C. FORUM 138, 138 (2001); Gostin
& Hodge, supra note 23; Malone, supra note 10.
39. Brent, supra note 37; Carney, supra note 38; Gostin & Hodge, supra
note 23; Malone, supra note 10, at 4.
40. Terry & Francis, supra, note 7, at 707.
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itself challenges the creation of and participation in a national
EHR network.
1. Minnesota’s Data Security Standards
Health data standards have been considered as part of
Minnesota’s overall privacy protection scheme.41 Recently the
Minnesota Department of Health (“MDH”), the agency that
coordinates EHR development and regulation, stated that it
has enacted interoperability data standards.42 There are data
standards for a few special areas such as e-prescribing.43
However, broad security standards applicable to all portions of
an EHR have yet to be developed. One committee has
recommended that Minnesota adopt federal recommendations
The federal
when such recommendations are made.44
government may ultimately make an interoperability data
standards recommendation through various private EHR
technology licensing entities such as the Certification
Commission for Health Information Technology (“CCHIT”) and
the Health Information Technology Standards Panel (“HITSP”).
However, the federal office in charge of EHR development, the
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology, essentially coordinates regional efforts to develop
Consequently,
the
cautious
EHR
technology.45
recommendation to wait for federal guidance does not
significantly move the state towards developing data security
standards for EHRs.
2. Consent: The Minnesota Health Records Act
The MHRA re-codified and modified pre-existing
Minnesota patient consent laws for the disclosure of medical
records in three key areas: (1) defining and regulating an RLS;
(2) developing the concept of a representation of consent; and
(3) shifting liability to a “bad actor” in the case of an unlawful
41. See, e.g., E-Health Initiative, supra note 3.
42. Id. at 6–7.
43. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126 (Supp. 2007).
44. See E-Health Initiative, supra note 4. The E-Health Committee is
comprised of various EHR stakeholders that recommends policies and laws to
the legislature to aid in EHR development and implementation.
45. U.S. Dept. of Health and Hum. Servs., Office of the National
Coordinator
for
Health
Information
Technology:
Mission,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/onc/mission (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
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disclosure.46 The legislative history shows that the Minnesota
State Legislature intended that the MHRA would encourage
EHR development while protecting patient privacy.47 It also
shows that the legislature failed to consider broader EHR and
privacy policies when developing the MHRA.48 In fact, of the
factors identified above (patient consent, data security
standards, and data use), the MHRA and preceding debates
focused only on the specific patient consent process.49
i. The Record Locator Service
The MHRA authorizes the development of RLSs, which in
essence are indices of the physical locations of the patients’
records.50 An RLS is owned by a Health Information Exchange
(“HIE”) which is a legal arrangement between various health
care entities (including payors) that have agreed to share
information.51 Any member of the HIE with information about
patients can enter non-clinical identifying information about
the patient into the RLS without the patient’s consent.52 Thus,
a payor, the MDH, or provider with records about a patient can
enter enough information to uniquely identify the patient
(name, date of birth, parents’ names, etc.) and can indicate that
they have records for that patient. The RLS does not contain
the actual patient records; it only indicates where the patient’s
records can be found.53
Only providers may access the RLS to get a record’s

46. See MINN. STAT. §§ 144.291, 144.293, subdiv. 2, 144.298 (Supp. 2007).
47. See, e.g., Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: Hearing on H.F. 1726
Before the H. Comm. On Health and Human Services, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn.
2007),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/ls85/healthpol031307.asx
[hereinafter Mar. 13, 2007 hearing]; Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007:
Hearing on H.F. 1726 Before the H. Comm. On Health and Human Services,
Leg.
Sess.
(Minn.
2007),
85th
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/ls85/healthpol031507.asx [hereinafter
Mar. 15, 2007 hearing].
48. Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47; Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra
note 47.
49. Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47; Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra
note 47.
50. MINN. STAT. §§ 144.293, subdiv. 8(a), 144.291, subdiv. 2(i) (Supp.
2007).
51. Id. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(b).
52. Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 8(a).
53. Id. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(i).
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location.54 Providers must have a patient’s consent to access the
information in the RLS.55 Further, the patient has the right to
completely opt-out of the RLS.56 This right can be exercised
when the physician is attempting to get consent to access the
RLS.57 The physician will educate the patient about the RLS
and the consent form will have an option to remove the patient
and any patient information from the index.58 However, the
patient cannot select which specific records he or she wants in
or out of the RLS so the provider will see all RLS entries. The
RLS has liability for improper disclosure of information from
the RLS.59
The MHRA intentionally does not require the creation of
one statewide RLS but rather allows as many RLSs as there
are HIEs that want to create them.60 In other words, Hospital
A and Hospital B could decide to enter into an HIE and create
their own RLS. Other entities like Payer C and Clinic D could
create another RLS. In order to deal with multiple patient
indices, either providers will need to access multiple RLSs, or a
separate RLS that indexes the various indices will be needed.
ii. Representation of Consent
The concept of representation of consent is new to the
MHRA. During the legislative hearings for this statute, both
the MDH, promoting the law, and the privacy advocates
opposing it, looked to Black’s Law Dictionary to define a
“representation.”61 The first definition is: “A presentation of
fact—either by words or conduct—made to induce someone to
act . . . .”62 In the context of the MHRA, a representation of
consent allows a physician to obtain consent to access records
from a patient and then to simply tell the disclosing provider
that the requesting provider has a valid consent.63 This
concept was developed for two reasons: first, to allow
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 8(a).
Id.
Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 8(d).
Id.
Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra note 47.
MINN. STAT. § 144.298, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2007).
May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (8th ed. 2004).
MINN. STAT. § 144.293, subdivs. 2(3)–3 (Supp. 2007).
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requesting physicians to skip the prior process of faxing
consent forms back and forth and, second, to allow requesting
physicians to electronically indicate that they have consent so
that they can receive the records immediately via an electronic
system.64
Representation is not an obvious solution to either of the
problems noted above. A statutorily adopted universal consent
form can resolve the first need.65 Minnesota now requires the
MDH consent form to be accepted as valid consent by all
providers.66 Consequently, the disclosing provider no longer
needs to spend time inspecting consent forms for validity. The
second problem could be dealt with through an electronic
consent process that transmits the actual consent form to the
disclosing computer system (once such a system is
implemented), as discussed below.
iii. Shared Liability
The MHRA changes the assignment of liability from the
prior law, which placed all responsibility for improper
disclosure of records on the disclosing physician.67 The MDH
argued that the original liability risk was so large that it
created fear of accepting consent forms from another provider
and slowed down the exchange of records.68 Therefore, liability
risk has been shifted to whomever the “bad actor” is (the
requesting provider, disclosing provider, or the RLS), instead of
Furthermore, the new
solely the disclosing physician.69
liability policy complements representation of disclosure by
encouraging disclosing physicians to trust that the requesting
physicians are truthfully representing that they have valid,
signed consent forms. If the disclosing physician discloses, and
the requesting physician lies about having consent, then the
requesting physician is liable for the disclosure.70
64. Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra note 47.
65. MINN. STAT. § 144.292, subdiv. 8 (Supp. 2007). See Minn. Dept. of
Health, Minnesota Standard Consent Form to Release Health Information,
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/dap/consent.pdf for the consent form.
66. See MINN. STAT. § 144.292, subdiv. 8 (Supp. 2007) (“A form developed
by the commissioner must be accepted by a provider as a legally enforceable
request under this section.”).
67. MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subdiv. 3a(h) (2006).
68. Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47.
69. MINN. STAT. § 144.298 (Supp. 2007).
70. MINN. STAT. § 144.298, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007).
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This liability shift may be unnecessary because there is
now a universal consent form. With the universal consent
form, all disclosing providers need to do is to verify that the
form appears to be the universal consent form in order to
protect themselves from liability as a result of negligence.
III. ANALYSIS: THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT
AS A PUBLIC HEALTH PRIVACY POLICY
The public health community should promote a patient
privacy policy for medical records as part of EHR development.
Such a policy should include provisions for patient consent,
data security standards, and information use regardless of
whether the government chooses to build the EHR
infrastructure itself or develop a regulatory framework through
which private entities act. This section examines the specific
provisions of the MHRA and their relation to patient privacy
protection. It also analyzes the MHRA as a piece of a larger
public health privacy policy.
A. THE PREVIOUS MINNESOTA MEDICAL RECORDS DISCLOSURE
LAW WAS A PERCEIVED BARRIER TO IMPLEMENTATION OF
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS
There are two questions central to whether the previous
consent law was an impediment to the development of EHRs:
first, was there the perception that the law was an impediment,
and, second, was the law actually an impediment?
Under the prior Minnesota consent law, consent to disclose
medical records generally expired after one year.71 However,
there was an exception to the expiration for disclosure to
providers who were being consulted in conjunction with current
treatment.72 “Current treatment” was an undefined term,
which gave rise to two competing interpretations of the law.73
The first interpretation was that a patient had to consent to the
release of medical records, but once that consent was made,
71. MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subdiv. 3a(a) (2006).
72. Id. § 144.335, subdiv. 3a(c)(1).
73. See Solutions Report, supra note 2, at 25 (“Some Legal Work Group
members argue that as long as the health information exchange is only for
patient treatment, then the patient’s consent can be fit into this exception.
However, other Legal Work Group members argue that, under their
interpretation, of ‘current treatment’ the consent for the RLS would expire in
one year.”).
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medical records could be released to the requesting provider so
long as she was currently treating the patient. That means
that if Patient X signed the consent form eighteen months prior
to coming in with a new problem, the physician could request
medical records without a new consent form because she was
currently treating the patient. The second interpretation was
that the patient must sign a new consent for release of medical
records every time the patient was seeking new treatment from
a provider. Under that interpretation, the patient consent for
release of records was valid for the treatment sought at the
time of initial diagnosis, but if the patient returned eighteen
months later with a new issue, a new consent for the release of
records was needed.74 The second interpretation is much more
restrictive of the release of medical records than the first. The
MDH asserted that the differences in interpretations created
“irreconcilable differences” between providers regarding proper
consent processes.75 The MDH does not appear to have
conducted a study or survey but, instead, relied on the
committee opinions that this confusion existed.76 Nevertheless,
it was likely necessary to amend the previous consent law to
clarify the process in order to alleviate confusion among
providers.
To fully answer the second question—whether the previous
consent law actually impeded the development of EHRs—one
must understand the prior consent process, the MDH vision for
the MHRA consent process, and the consent process as it works
today. The MDH explained the prior consent process to the
Senate Judiciary Committee.77 Under the more restrictive
interpretation of the prior law, Doctor A determines that
Patient X has medical records at another facility from Patient
X’s statements at Patient X’s initial appointment. Patient X
signs a consent form for the release of those records. Doctor A
faxes the signed consent form to the facility with the records.
That facility then inspects the signed consent form to
74. See id. at 27–28 (detailing the two interpretations of “current
treatment” and the implications on patient consent requirements).
75. See id. at 3 (“[T]here are significant and irreconcilable differences in
organizations’ interpretations of Minnesota’s patient consent requirements.
These differences make it impossible for health care providers to agree on
‘when’ and ‘how’ patient consent is required.”).
76. See generally id. at 5–7 (describing the background, purpose, and
methods of the Minnesota e-Health Initiative).
77. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6.
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determine whether the consent is valid under Minnesota law.
If it is valid, the facility releases the records to Doctor A via
messenger or mail. If the facility finds the consent lacking,
Doctor A drafts a new consent form that meets the disclosing
facility’s standards and has Patient X sign it. Ultimately,
Patient X cannot be treated until the records are at Doctor A’s
office. Therefore, under this scenario, it is likely that Patient X
will need to schedule another appointment to be treated at a
time after the records have been received by Doctor A.
The MDH explained its picture of how an EHR health
system would work from the patient’s perspective.78 Doctor A
determines, from Patient X’s statements, that Patient X has
medical records at other facilities. Patient X signs a consent
form for the RLS, and Doctor A uses the RLS to find the
physical location of Patient X’s records. Next, Patient X signs a
second consent form giving Doctor A permission to access the
actual health records from the facilities holding them. Doctor A
checks a box in his computer that represents that he has the
necessary consent from the patient to view the records he
requests. The computer communicates with the computerized
database at the other facility (not the RLS) which makes the
records available to Doctor A for viewing. All of this would
happen in real time, so that Patient X may have his records
reviewed during the initial appointment.79
Comparing these consent processes, EHR benefits to
treatment come from the ability of the requesting and
disclosing facilities to exchange records electronically.
However, the MHRA does not require interoperable technology;
it only changes the consent process to allow for an RLS. It
would be perfectly plausible to integrate the technology
envisioned in the MDH’s description with the consent process
of the prior law and without an RLS. Under such a system,
Doctor A would still find Patient X’s records from Patient X’s
description (not an RLS) and Patient X would sign a consent
form for access to those records. Instead of faxing a consent
form to the disclosing facility, Doctor A could send the form to
that facility electronically. The disclosing facility would still
inspect the form for validity as it did under prior law. Upon
finding the consent form valid, the disclosing facility would

78. See id.
79. Id.
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send Doctor A the requested records electronically. Thus,
Patient X’s records could be reviewed by Doctor A at the initial
appointment. Both the modified prior consent process and the
envisioned MHRA process would yield health benefits from
technology that is not yet widely implemented.
The MHRA consent process with current technology will
not yield the health benefits associated with EHRs. Under the
MHRA, Doctor A learns from Patient X that there may be
records at another facility. Patient X signs a consent form
granting Doctor A access to the RLS. Doctor A locates records
in the RLS and then requests that Patient X sign another
consent form for the release of the specific records Doctor A
needs. Patient X signs that consent form. Doctor A calls the
facilities holding Patient X’s records and represents that he has
a valid consent for those records from Patient X. The facility
then sends the records over to Doctor A. However, because
interoperable technology still has not been implemented, the
records are likely messengered or mailed to Doctor A.
Therefore, Patient X still must make a second appointment to
see Doctor A after the doctor has had a chance to review the
records. The MHRA impacts the process described above only
up to the point of Patient X’s signature on the second consent.
The actual exchange of electronic records that is envisioned
after that point is a possibility, but not a reality in Minnesota
because the necessary interoperable technology has not been
designed or implemented.
1. The Prior Consent Law Did Need To Be Revised
Although the prior consent law was not an actual barrier to
EHR development, it did need revision because it was a
perceived barrier and because it was silent as to the rules for
electronic exchange. The electronic exchange of records was
not taken into consideration when the previous law was
drafted.80 Therefore, the law did not discuss consent issues
surrounding electronic exchange. Because the previous law
was silent, there was a larger potential for abuse of electronic
exchange where entities could act without any regulation. For
example, nothing in the previous law would have prevented the
80. See Solutions Report, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he patient consent
requirements were designed for paper-based exchanges of information and
early electronic data base systems that are not conducive to real-time,
automated electronic exchange of information.”).
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development of an RLS. The law prohibited the disclosure of
health records without patient consent. However, an RLS is an
index that simply lists patients’ names and the clinics where
their records reside. That information was not part of the
health record and, thus, could have been collected regardless of
the law.81
Requiring patient consent to access information in an RLS
(or another electronic database) instead of requiring consent for
data collection was another necessary development. There are
at least four increasingly complex models outlining how
Each of these models
electronic exchange could work.82
requires either that EHRs be centrally collected or at least be
centrally searchable.83 Requiring consent from patients to
include their records in the system would probably be so timeconsuming that the 2015 state mandate for interoperable
records would be difficult to meet.84 However, requiring
consent only to access the information still protects patient
information while allowing development to move forward.
Although this mechanism was unnecessary for an RLS because
the RLS does not contain health records, the “opt-out” concept
is important for the development and collection of EHRs.85
In sum, the previous law was not a structural barrier to
the development of EHRs; however, it was necessary to revise
the law in some way to resolve disagreement between providers
over the consent process and to resolve the perception that it
was a barrier. Furthermore, it is preferable for the state to
better ensure privacy protection by developing a consent
process for EHRs that discourages abuse rather than to remain
81. Interestingly, the previous law did not define health records, so
whether the RLS would have been legal may have depended upon whether or
not the patient’s name is considered part of the health record (although it
would not be considered part of a health record under HIPAA or the new
MHRA). See HEALTH INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY COLLABORATION
NATIONAL MEETING, REFORM STATE LAWS RELATED TO THE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/mpsp/healthrecordsact2007.pdf for a
document comparing the old and new law comparing old and new laws.
82. MINNESOTA PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROJECT LEGAL WORK GROUP,
CURRENT AND EMERGING MODELS OF HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE:
POTENTIAL PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND LEGAL ISSUES (2006), available at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/mpsp/legwg/potlegissues071106.pdf.
83. See id.
84. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6.
85. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
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silent and allow EHR systems to develop unregulated.
B. PUBLIC HEALTH NEEDS WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE
MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT
There are two potential public health benefits related to
EHRs that the MHRA could have developed. First, EHRs could
be used for disaster planning and relief during patient
relocation.86 If the MHRA had required the RLS to be able to
access the actual EHRs, this public health benefit could have
been met. The RLS is not currently available for this use
because it is limited to being solely an index of the records’
physical location, although it could be developed to allow this
use. Second, the RLS could serve a public health function for
emergency treatment if it allowed access to a complete list of a
patient’s records. However, because the law envisions multiple
RLSs, the public health benefits of the RLS are greatly
reduced. Even if a patient’s records were indexed in one RLS,
they may not be indexed or may be only partially indexed in the
particular RLS to which the provider has access. Furthermore,
without the ability to directly access the actual records
electronically, the RLS may not reduce the time it takes to
access the needed records once they have been located.
The other large public health need for EHRs is related to
research.87 The MHRA did not, and was not intended to, create
a public health database that would allow researchers to access
de-identified aggregate data. Again the RLS could develop into
a system that allows such research but the MHRA did not
envision it. Ultimately, public health uses of EHRs were not
considered under the MHRA.
Individual privacy protection was considered by the
drafters of the MHRA, at least insofar as individuals can
consent to record disclosure. However, public health privacy
protections require a broader privacy policy that encompasses
data security and control over use of information. Public health
should be particularly concerned with policies regarding
appropriate information use because of the potential for data
misuse to have broad social consequences. The MHRA does not
discuss appropriate data use at all. While it clearly outlaws
dissemination of records, it places no limits on providers’ access
86. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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to the RLS index once a patient consents to it. Notably, the
MHRA does not limit providers’ access to the RLS for
treatment purposes.
Arguably, the administrative and
marketing arm of a provider network (which would still be a
“provider” under the statute) could access the RLS once consent
is given and mine the index for data about patient traffic
between the provider and its competitors. There is no law or
policy allowing, disallowing, or regulating this kind of data use.
For some particular public health endeavors, such as
mental health, drug treatment, and family planning,
confidentiality is especially important. Patients who do not feel
that these records are kept confidential may not seek treatment
at all.88 The MHRA does not allow patients to shield specific
providers they have visited from the RLS. Thus, patients have
the choice to either participate fully in the RLS or not
participate at all. Patients who wish to keep certain visits
confidential will either choose to not participate in the RLS
(which has one set of undesirable public health consequences)
or will choose not to seek treatment (which can also have
adverse public health consequences). Ultimately this dilemma
is untenable for public health. If the MHRA had considered
these problems it could have required the RLS to allow
individuals to selectively shield specific information from it.
That policy would have respected the individual’s autonomy
and right to control access to their records while also avoiding
the potential repercussions explained above.

88. There may be state consent laws related to these particularly sensitive
areas that prevent the inclusion of these records in the RLS, but specific
exclusions are not contemplated by the MHRS. See e.g. Mental Health: A
Report
from
the
Surgeon
General,
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter1/sec1.html#appr
oach (last visited Dec. 11, 2008)(discussing the stigma associated with mental
illness, and the impact that stigma has on seeking treatment). The logical
conclusion is publicizing and individual’s treatment may make him or her less
likely to seek it to begin with. Similar arguments can be made for both drug
treatment and family planning decisions. See e.g. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human
Services,
Alcohol
and
Drug
Information,
http://ncadi.samhsa.gov/govpubs/bkd107/2f17.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2008)
(noting that one impact of required reporting laws is that women may forego
care).
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C. THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT DOES NOT BALANCE
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY WITH ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD
DEVELOPMENT
The MHRA does not balance individual privacy with EHR
development because the law neither inhibits nor encourages
EHR development. The MHRA itself does not create an EHR
system. The real benefit of instant access to EHRs will come
when health records are actually exchanged electronically.
Neither electronic transmission of consent nor electronic
disclosure of records is required by the MHRA, and the
technologies needed to complete these steps have not yet been
implemented. Thus, the MHRA does not create an EHR
system.
Furthermore, the electronic provisions in the MHRA are
specifically tailored to the development of an RLS, which may
or may not be useful in the ultimate EHR system. The RLS
could develop into a system that allows a physician, with the
proper consent, to access records at another facility
electronically. But it is equally likely that the state will
develop a different infrastructure where the RLS is irrelevant
to the electronic exchange of information. The concept is
further confused by the fact that the MDH intends for there to
be multiple RLSs.89 Consequently, even if an RLS is useful for
one HIE, a broader RLS would have to be created to search all
of the other RLSs before this approach would work as a
statewide system.
The MHRA is concerned with individual privacy, but the
law neither strengthens nor weakens privacy protections as
compared to the prior consent law. The fact that an individual
cannot shield specific information from the RLS is a glaring
privacy problem. However, the MHRA requires the patient to
consent twice to providers’ access to records before a physician
can view them, whereas the previous law required the patient’s
consent only once.90 This added consent requirement may
provide more privacy protection even as it slows down a
provider’s access to patient records. It is impossible to assess
whether the MHRA will provide sufficient privacy protection in
an EHR system because the other components of a privacy
policy, data security and information use, have not yet been
89. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6.
90. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
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developed. The MDH might argue that the MHRA is one small
piece of a much larger EHR and privacy picture and that this
law, while not directly creating EHRs, removes at least one
barrier to development. The problem is that the rest of the
picture is still so vague and unknown that it is difficult to know
whether this law will be congruent with the entire scheme or
will need another revision.
D. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS
ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED
1. The Record Locator Service
The RLS provisions have two significant problems. First,
the RLS does not allow individuals to shield specific
information and, second, the MHRA allows multiple RLSs to
develop. Privacy advocates objected to the RLS, testifying that
even without medical records, the RLS may expose significant
patient information to a large number of people.91 The term
“provider” is not limited to a care giver but may extend to the
Therefore
administrative arm of a hospital or clinic.92
individuals that are not caregivers may be accessing the
information in the RLS. Also, the RLS may reveal significant
medical information simply by listing the clinic or physician
that the patient visited. For example, if the RLS lists that
records are located at Planned Parenthood, the individual
accessing the RLS may draw conclusions about the patient’s
sexual activity or family planning decisions. A policy that both
allows patients to remove specific information about
themselves from the RLS and controls how RLS information
can be used would limit this privacy threat.
Privacy advocates further argued that a physician might
learn information about a patient that are not related to the
physician’s treatment of that patient.93 The patient may not
understand the implications of withholding certain information
from the RLS. For example, a patient may think that a dentist
does not need to know about the patient’s cancer history
because the dentist is only treating the teeth. A dentist might
91. See, e.g., Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47.
92. See MINN. STAT. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(h) (Supp. 2007)(the definition
explicitly includes a licensed health care facility, which could have many nonlicensed professionals accessing information for administrative reasons).
93. See sources cited supra notes 38–39.
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examine a patient more carefully or change prescriptions or
treatment plans if the dentist knows that the patient is also
being treated for cancer.
Furthermore, a physician is
prohibited from disclosing medical information in the RLS
without consent by both the MHRA and the state licensing
standards.94 Nevertheless, the patient should have ultimate
control over any disclosure of her medical records. Yet the
system, as it is currently envisioned, limits the patient’s choice
to either opting entirely in or entirely out of the RLSs.
The fact that the MHRA allows for multiple RLSs to be
developed seriously limits the utility of the system because a
patient’s records might be indexed in several RLSs and there is
no provision for a single master index covering all RLSs.
Further, because these RLSs are owned and operated by an
HIE, they will be funded by the health care entities in the HIE.
Presumably, charges to the patient will ultimately fund the
operation of an RLS. Given that there will be many RLSs and
a hospital might have to belong to many of them to get a
complete picture of its patients’ records, these costs will be
driven up unnecessarily. A cleaner solution is simply to create
a central RLS.
2. Representation of Consent
Privacy advocates objected to the representation of consent
because they felt that made it too easy for an individual to lie
in order to access records. In other words, insurers or
employers could simply present themselves as a provider with
consent and have records released to them. This argument is
weak because even without the concept of representation, an
individual interested in obtaining medical records can
manufacture a paper consent and fax it to a physician.
Basically, an individual intent on stealing specific records can
lie and do so regardless of the consent process.
Two electronic solutions were suggested at the hearings:
(1) using electronic signatures or (2) using electronic pads
similar to those used at grocery stores for credit card
validation.95 It is unclear why neither of these options was
adopted in the final bill, and the MDH did not offer a reason at
the hearings. There are three advantages to these solutions:
94. MINN. STAT. § 147.091, subdivs. 1(o, m) (Supp. 2007).
95. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 7.
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(1) they would eliminate the need for providers to keep paper
consent forms; (2) they would remove the perception that the
MHRA weakens patient privacy protection in order to promote
EHR development; and (3) they would strengthen privacy
protection because a “bad actor” would have to hack into a
closed system, manufacture the signature, and relay it to the
disclosing computer system. Currently, a “bad actor” would
have to print the universal consent form from the MDH
webpage, forge a patient’s signature on it, and fax it to the
disclosing office. This approach requires much less expertise
than hacking into a sophisticated and secure database system.
The representation of consent is an unsatisfactory device to
promote information exchange because it increases the
perception that patient consent is weakened while, at the same
time, it fails to provide the greater security protections
inherent in an electronic consent process. An electronic
consent process should be developed and implemented and the
representation of consent repealed.
E. THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT AS PART OF A BROAD
PRIVACY POLICY
From a public health perspective, the MHRA does not
provide a satisfactory privacy policy for EHRs. Such a policy
should include consent, data security requirements, and
controls over information use. Regulations in each of these
three areas must be coordinated with one another because the
requirements of one section may affect the requirements of the
others. The MHRA deals only with the consent issue, not with
the other two areas of concern. It is likely that the MHRA will
have to be revised again when those areas have been developed
and when it becomes clear whether the RLS will be part of
Minnesota’s EHR system.
In one significant way, the MHRA may actually inhibit
further privacy policy development. The RLS is run by private
non-governmental entities that make money operating it.
These RLSs will now be stakeholders in any further EHR
development and will have an interest in maintaining the RLS
whether or not the RLS is a logical electronic component for the
EHR system. Furthermore, these stakeholders will probably be
interested in maintaining private development of the electronic
infrastructure which could block the government from
developing a universal system that would promote public
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health interests.
In sum, the MHRA should be amended to allow individuals
to shield specific information from the RLS, to create one
central RLS rather than allowing for the development of
multiple RSLs, and to develop an electronic consent process to
replace the representation of consent. Finally, the MHRA may
have to be further altered as regulations for data security
standards and control over data use are developed. Without
those pieces, it is impossible to know whether the RLS consent
requirements provide sufficient privacy protection for EHRs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The benefits of EHRs for efficiency in treatment alone are
great enough that health care companies will continue to move
away from paper records. The benefits in individual care and
public health are of a great enough social benefit to justify a
public policy supporting a shift to EHRs. Patient privacy
protection is integral to the public health benefits of EHRs
because, without it, data collected through EHR networks may
be unreliable. Furthermore, the ease with which entire bodies
of electronic records can be disseminated en masse and the
ability to mine that data in unforeseen ways poses a heightened
threat to individual privacy if the data were used
inappropriately. Patient consent to dissemination of records
may produce unintended and possibly adverse consequences in
large part because we cannot yet foresee the entire impact of
EHRs on individual health care and public health. Therefore,
patient consent, while still a necessary component of privacy
protection in an electronic era, is not a sufficient protection by
itself.
Public health agencies should advocate for privacy policies
that will adequately protect patients because a lack of
regulation will allow for information misuse to occur. To
adequately protect privacy, laws supporting EHR technology
need to include regulations covering at least the following
areas: (1) patient consent to the release of medical records; (2)
state-of-the-art data security for electronic systems; and (3)
acceptable data use, including any sale of information that is
illegally obtained from the EHR system. Regulations in all
three areas need to be developed simultaneously because it is
difficult to know how to adequately regulate one area without
some sense of how the other two areas will be handled. For
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example, it is difficult to develop a patient consent law without
knowing what the data security requirements will be, for the
data security may impact both the kind of patient consent
required and the point at which the patient should give it.
The MHRA was portrayed in the media as a major step
toward the development of EHR technology in Minnesota. The
e-health committee publications maintained that the MHRA
strengthened rather than weakened privacy protection. The
MHRA does not necessarily move Minnesota towards e-health.
The electronic innovations in the law are limited to an RLS
that is only an electronic index of the physical locations of
records. That index could be used in the final EHR system, but
it is equally likely that it will not be. As an individual privacy
policy, the MHRA is neither more nor less protective of
individual privacy than the prior law was, nor is it more or less
burdensome. The MHRA requires two consent forms instead of
one to access records, but as it will be used today a patient may
still have to make a separate appointment to be treated on the
basis of outside records. The MHRA simply creates a different
consent process than the prior consent law did. The MHRA
should, however, be amended in at least three ways: 1) to allow
individuals to shield specific information from the RLS, 2) to
require the creation of one central RLS, and 3) to replace the
representation of consent with an electronic consent process.
These changes would strengthen privacy protections and better
meet public health purposes.
As a public health privacy policy, the MHRA is not
sufficient. The MHRA focuses narrowly on the patient consent
process for records disclosure, and thus only deals with one of
the three interdependent public health privacy components.
Because the other two components, data security standards
and data use, are not yet developed, it is impossible to
determine whether the MHRA will provide a sufficient consent
process for the future electronic health record system. It is
likely that the MHRA will be revised again once EHRs have
been more fully developed.

